This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Fernandez, Raquel
Rosenthal, Robert W

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The sovereign-debt literature has often implicitly assumed that all the power in the bargaining game between debtor and creditor lies with the latter. This paper explores that assumption by analyzing three game-theoretic models of debt renegotiations. In two of the models, both of which are built on the traditional one-sector growth model, all the subgame-perfect equilibria have an extreme form in which the game's surplus is captured by the creditor. The third game has many subgame-perfect equilibria that do not have this feature, however. The roles of various assumptions in all three games are examined. Copyright 1990 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199007%2957%3A3%3C331%3ASMOSR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T&origin=bc
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 57 (1990)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 331-49
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:57:y:1990:i:3:p:331-49

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0034-6527

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0034-6527

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Bernardo Guimaraes, 2008. "Optimal External Debt and Default," CEP Discussion Papers dp0847, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  2. Kenneth M. Kletzer & Brian D. Wright, 2000. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 621-639, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Monika Schnitzer, 1995. "Debt versus Foreign Direct Investment: The Impact of Sovereing Risk on the Structure of Capital Flows to Developing Countries," Discussion Paper Serie A 484, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. Luisa Lambertini, 2001. "Volatility and Sovereign Default," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 577, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1994. "The role of institutions in reputation models of sovereign debt," Staff Report 179, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Cristina Echevarria, 2000. "Non-homothetic preferences and growth," Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 9(2), pages 151-171, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Kim Oosterlinck & Loredana Ureche-Rangau, 2004. "Entre la peste et le choléra Le détenteur d’obligations peut préférer la répudiation au défaut…," Working Papers CEB 04-021.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Business School, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
  8. Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1991. "Reputation with multiple relationships: reviving reputation models of debt," Staff Report 137, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  9. Guimarães, Bernardo, 2007. "Optimal external debt and default," CEPR Discussion Papers 6035, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1996. "Reputation spillover across relationships: reviving reputation models of debt," Staff Report 209, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  11. Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1996. "Reputation Spillover Across Relationships with Enduring and Transient Beliefs: Reviving reputation Models of Debt," NBER Working Papers 5486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Kenneth Kletzer & Brian Wright, 2006. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series 1024, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
  13. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Recurrent Debt Problems and International Safety Nets," Business School Working Papers safetynets, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
  14. Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1997. "Models of sovereign debt: partial vs. general reputations," Working Papers 580, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  15. Kohlscheen, Emanuel & O'Connell, Stephen A., 2006. "A Sovereign Debt Model with Trade Credit and Reserves," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 743, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About five million pdf files are downloaded through RePEc every year.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-11.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.