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Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market

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Author Info
Noldeke, Georg
van Damme, Eric

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Abstract

This paper analyzes a multiperiod version of the Spence job market signaling model in which workers cannot commit to an education choice and firms make wage offers at any point in time. The dynamic competition combined with the incomplete information yields a multiplicity of sequential equilibria, including ones that sustain implicit collusion, even though the length of the game is finite. Emphasis is placed on equilibria that satisfy the "independence of never weak best response" criterion of E. Kohlberg and J. F. Mertens (1986). It is shown that in the limit, as the time between offers tends to zero, any such equilibrium results (in expectation) in the unique stable outcome of the static Spence model. Copyright 1990 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 57 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 1-23
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:57:y:1990:i:1:p:1-23

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  1. Stefano Ficco, 2004. "Information Overload in Monopsony Markets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-082/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ayça Kaya, 2005. "Repeated Signaling Games," CIE Discussion Papers 2005-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ellingsen, Tore & Rydqvist, Kristian, 1997. "The Stock Market as a Screening Device and the Decision to Go Public," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 174, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Kremer, Ilan, 2005. "Ratings, Certifications and Grades: Dynamic Signaling and Market Breakdown," Research Papers 1814r2, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. MAHENC Philippe, 2006. "Lemons are Green: The Informative Role of a Pigovian Tax," Working Papers 06.05.198, LERNA, University of Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  6. Kim, Sunwoong & Mohtadi, Hamid, 1992. "Education, Job Signaling, and Dual Labor Markets in Developing Countries," Bulletins 7503, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center. [Downloadable!]
  7. Maarten C.W. Janssen, 2000. "Catching Hipo's: Screening, Wages and Unemployment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-028/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  8. Massimo Giannini, 1999. "Education And Job Market Signalling: How Robust Is The Nexus?," Working Papers 35, Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Public Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "On-the-Job Signaling and Self-Confidence," Discussion Papers 1274, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  10. Daniel R. Vincent, 1989. "Bilateral Monopoly, Non-durable Goods and Dynamic Trading Relationships," Discussion Papers 832, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  11. Luis Cabral, 2007. "Lock in and Switch: Asymmetric Information and New Product Diffusion," Working Papers 07-11, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Daniel R. Vincent, 1988. "Dynamic Auctions," Discussion Papers 770, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  13. Anton Miglo, 2006. "Optimal compensation contracts under asymmetric information concerning expected earnings," Working Papers 0613, University of Guelph, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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