Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism

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Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism

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Tian, Guoqiang

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Guoqiang Tian

Abstract

This paper considers the problem of designing mechanisms whose Nash allocations coincide with the Lindahl allocations for public goods economies with more than one private good. Unlike previous mechanisms, the mechanism presented here has a single-valued, feasible, and continuous outcome function. Furthermore, when there are no public goods in economies, feasible and continuous implementation of the (constrained) Walrasian correspondence can be obtained as a corollary of the authors' first theorem. Copyright 1989 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 56 (1989)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 613-21
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:56:y:1989:i:4:p:613-21

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Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen & Rajiv Vohra, 1994. "Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 173-203, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bezalel Peleg, 1996. "Double implementation of the Lindahl equilibrium by a continuous mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 311-324, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Peleg, B., 1995. "Double Implementation of the Lindahl Equilibrium by a Continuous Mechanism," Papers 9524, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1999. "Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods," Economic theory and game theory 009, Nir Dagan. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1995. "Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods," Working Papers 95-14, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 2002. "Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods," Staff General Research Papers 5246, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Roberto Serrano, 1999. "Feasible implementation of taxation methods," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 57-72. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Economics Working Papers 0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
William Thomson, 2004. "Divide-and-Permute," RCER Working Papers 510, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Thomson, William, 2005. "Divide-and-permute," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 186-200, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Luis Corchon & Simon Wilkie, 1996. "Double implementation of the ratio correspondence by a market mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 325-337, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Working Papers 5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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