Dynamic Consistency, Revelations in Auctions and the Structure of Preferences
AbstractAnalyzing the optimal bidding behavior in ascending-bid auctions and second-price, sealed-bid auctions with independent private values, the authors show that expected utility maximizing behavior is equivalent to (1) dynamically consistent bidding in ascending-bid auctions; (2) the equivalence of the optimal bids in ascending-bid auctions and in second-price, sealed-bid auctions; and (3) bidding the value of the object in second-price, sealed-bid auctions. In addition, the optimal bid in ascending-bid auctions equals the value of the object, if and only if, the bidder's preferences on lotteries are both quasi-concave and quasi-convex. Copyright 1989 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 56 (1989)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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