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Non-cooperative Bargaining and Union Formation Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Jun, Byoung Heon
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The author studies a union formation decision problem when workers consist of two groups distinguished by different productivities. Workers may form either a joint union or two separate unions. The whole decision process is modeled as an extensive-form bargaining game. Workers form a joint union when the sizes or productivities of the groups are similar. In the first case, there is a wage differential that is more (less) than proportional to the productivity difference if the size of the more productive is smaller (larger) than that of the less productive. In the second case, there is no wage differential. Copyright 1989 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies .
Volume (Year): 56 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 59-76
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:56:y:1989:i:1:p:59-76Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0034-6527
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