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Ex Post Information in Auctions

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Author Info
Riley, John G

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Abstract

When buyers' private information about the value of an item for sale is correlat ed, the seller can increase expected revenue in a sealed bid auction. Specifically, revenue can be increased by making the payment a funct ion of all the losing bids. In addition, there are gains to making th e payment contingent upon some signal of the object's value which bec omes public at a later date. That is, there are gains to introducing positive royalty value. Copyright 1988 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 55 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 409-29
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:55:y:1988:i:3:p:409-29

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Oil Lease Auctions: Reconciling Economic Theory with Practice," UCLA Economics Working Papers 292, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Douglas K. Reece, 1979. "An Analysis of Alternative Bidding Systems for Leasing Offshore Oil," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(2), pages 659-669, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Fieseler, Karsten, 1997. "Bidding for unit-price contracts - How craftsmen should bid," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 97-03, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
  2. Hannu Vartiainen, 2003. "Auction Design without Commitment," Working Papers 2003.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Giuseppe Lopomo, 2004. "Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000391, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Cornelli, Francesca & Felli, Leonhard, 2000. "How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Kessler, Anke & Lülfesmann, Christoph & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 3428, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Nobuo Akai & Emilson Silva, 2009. "Interregional redistribution as a cure to the soft budget syndrome in federations," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 43-58, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Hans-Werner Sinn & Alfons Weichenrieder, 1997. "Foreign Direct Investment, Political Resentment and the Privatization Process in Eastern Europe," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Nicola Persico, 1997. "Information Acquisition in Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 762, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000285, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Jean Tirole, 1991. "Privatization in Eastern Europe: Incentives and the Economics of Transition," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1991, Volume 6, pages 221-268 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  11. Gärtner, Dennis & Schmutzler, Armin, 2006. "Merger Negotiations and Ex-Post Regret," CEPR Discussion Papers 5911, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Boeheim, Rene & Zulehner, Christine, 1996. "Auctions - A Survey," Economics Series 39, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
  13. Peter M. DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2004. "Bidding With Securities: Auctions and Security Design," NBER Working Papers 10891, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Ronald M. Harstad & Aleksandar Pekec & Ilia Tsetlin, 2005. "Information Aggregation in Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders," Working Papers 0605, Department of Economics, University of Missouri. [Downloadable!]
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