Ex Post Information in Auctions
AbstractWhen buyers' private information about the value of an item for sale is correlat ed, the seller can increase expected revenue in a sealed bid auction. Specifically, revenue can be increased by making the payment a funct ion of all the losing bids. In addition, there are gains to making th e payment contingent upon some signal of the object's value which bec omes public at a later date. That is, there are gains to introducing positive royalty value. Copyright 1988 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 55 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0034-6527
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Oil Lease Auctions: Reconciling Economic Theory with Practice," UCLA Economics Working Papers 292, UCLA Department of Economics.
- John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979.
UCLA Economics Working Papers
152, UCLA Department of Economics.
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