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An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public Goods Provision Mechanisms

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Author Info
Banks, Jeffrey S
Plott, Charles R
Porter, David P

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Abstract

This paper reports on an experimental investigation of four methods of allocating public goods. The two basic processes studied ar e direct contribution and a public goods auction process. Both of the se processes are studied with and without an additional unanimity fea ture. The results suggest that the auction process outperforms direct contribution. The effect of unanimity is to decrease the efficiency of both processes. Much of the paper is focused on an analysis of the se results. Copyright 1988 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 55 (1988)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 301-22
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:55:y:1988:i:2:p:301-22

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  1. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2002. "Vernon Smith's Insomnia and the Dawn of Economics as Experimental Science," Microeconomics 0212001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Steffen Ziss, 1996. "Public good provision and the Smith Process," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 245-261, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Sven Fischer & Andreas Nicklisch, 2006. "Ex Interim Voting in Public Good Provision," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_23, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  4. Glenn W. Harrison, 2005. "Field Experiments and Control," Artefactual Field Experiments 0049, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
  5. Sven Fischer & Andreas Nicklisch, 2006. "Ex Interim Voting in Public Good Provision," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-13, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.

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