This paper analyzes the very long run, or "stationary state," impact of an unfunded social security system, using an overlapping generations mo del framework. A key feature is that while parents care about their c hildren and can leave non-negative bequests to them, children also ca re about their parents and can make non-negative "gifts" to them. T he author shows that the possibility of negative "net bequests" may make social security less harmful to private wealth accumulation tha n would otherwise be the case. A subsidiary finding is that risk-lovi ng behavior may emerge for some households due to the nature of inter generational transfers within families. Copyright 1988 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Volume (Year): 55 (1988) Issue (Month): 2 (April) Pages: 275-99 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Casey B. Mulligan & Ricard Gil & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2002.
"Social Security and democracy,"
Discussion Papers
0102-63, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
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