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Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding

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Author Info
Wolinsky, Asher
Abstract

The model features a dynamic market in steady state in which prices ar e determined in first-price auctions. It combines competition over ti me, familiar from the pairwise meeting models, with instantaneous bid ding competition. It inquires how different properties of the model d etermine the relative importance of these two aspects of the competit ion and, in particular, how the non-market-clearing price result of t he matching and bargaining models is affected by the introduction of instantaneous bidding competition. If there is some heterogeneity in buyers' valuations of the traded goods, then, when the market is fric tionless enough, the instantaneous bidding competition effectively di sappears and the non-market-clearing price result can obtain. Copyright 1988 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 55 (1988)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 71-84
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:55:y:1988:i:1:p:71-84

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  1. Satterthwaite, Mark & Shneyerov, Art, 2004. "Dynamic Matching,Two-sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition," Micro Theory Working Papers shneyerov-04-12-17-02-54-, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 17 Dec 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 2008. "An ascending double auction," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 281-306, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. John Kennes, 2004. "Competitive Auctions: Theory and Application," Discussion Papers 04-16, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Mark Satterthwaite & Artyom Shneyerov, 2003. "Convergence of a Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Market with Two-sided Incomplete Information to Perfect Competition," Discussion Papers 1384, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Benoît Julien & John Kennes & Ian King, 2005. "Monetary Exchange with Multilateral Matching," Discussion Papers 05-18, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised Oct 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. John Kennes & Aaron Schiff, 2003. "The Value of a Reputation System," Industrial Organization 0301011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  7. Art Shneyerov, 2006. "Dynamic Matching with Two-sided Incomplete Information and Participation Costs," Theory workshop papers 815595000000000009, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer, 2008. "Fee Setting Intermediaries: On Real Estate Agents, Stock Brokers, and Auction Houses," Discussion Papers 1472, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  9. Shneyerov, Art & Wong, Adam Chi Leung, 2007. "The Rate of Convergence to Perfect Competition of a Simple Matching and Bargaining Mechanism," Micro Theory Working Papers shneyerov-07-05-01-03-43-, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 01 May 2007. [Downloadable!]
  10. Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, 1991. "Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation," Papers of Peter Cramton 91jleo, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Artyom Shneyerov & Adam Chi Leung Won, 2008. "The Rate of Convergence to Perfect Competition of Matching and Bargaining Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 1467, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  12. Klaus Kultti & Tuomas Takalo & Juuso Toikka, 2005. "Patents Hinder Collusion," Industrial Organization 0503015, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  13. Gianni De Fraja & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Walras Retrouve: Decentralized Trading Mechanisms and the Competitive Price," ESE Discussion Papers 36, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Ken Binmore, 1994. "Bargaining theory without tears," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 18(3), pages 403-419, September. [Downloadable!]
  15. Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 1995. "Competition Among Sellers who offer Auctions Instead of Prices," Working Papers peters-95-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Sergei Severinov & Michael Peters, 2004. "Internet Trading Mechanisms And Rational Expectations," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 551, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  17. John Kennes & Aaron Schiff, 2006. "Informational Intermediation and Competing Auctions," Discussion Papers 06-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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