This paper presents a technique for demonstrating the existence of a un ique equilibrium that is applicable to a variety of models in which t he price at which goods are traded in a market is determined by pairw ise bargaining between individual buyers and sellers who are brought together by some matching process. The results are framed in terms of a new equilibrium no-tion: in a security equilibrium, no player will settle for a payoff, under any contingency, which is less than his s ecurity level given the occurrence of that contingency. The technique is applied in detail to a generalization of a model of A. Rubinstein and A. Wolinsky (1985). Copyright 1988 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Volume (Year): 55 (1988) Issue (Month): 1 (January) Pages: 33-48 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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