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Matching and Bargaining in Dynamic Markets

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Author Info
Binmore, Ken G
Herrero, M J
Abstract

This paper examines a matching and bargaining model of a dynamic market for an indivisible good. On entering the market , buyers and sellers wait to be matched with an agent of the opposite type. Once a pair is matched, they bargain. The bargaining continues until agreement is reached or else one or both of the agents is matc hed elsewhere. After reaching agreement, both agents immediately leav e the market. The unique equilibrium is characterized for the case of continuous time and infinite numbers of agents of both types. Copyright 1988 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 55 (1988)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 17-31
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:55:y:1988:i:1:p:17-31

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  1. Duarte Brito & Pedro Pereira, 2006. "Access to Bottleneck Inputs under Oligopoly: a Prisoners Dilemma?," Working Papers 16, Portuguese Competition Authority. [Downloadable!]
  2. Hamid Sabourian, 2000. "Bargaining and Markets: Complexity and the Walrasian Outcome," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1249, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Nirvikar Singh, 2004. "Nash Bargaining versus Market Outcomes," Game Theory and Information 0412004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Melvyn Coles & Randall Wright, 1994. "Dynamic bargaining theory," Staff Report 172, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  5. Charalambos Aliprantis & Gabriele Camera & Daniela Puzzello, 2006. "Matching and anonymity," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 415-432, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Sjaak Hurkens & Nir Vulkan, 2006. "Dynamic Matching and Bargaining: The Role of Deadlines," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 660.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 19 Apr 2006. [Downloadable!]
  7. Douglas Gale & Hamid Sabourian, 2003. "Complexity and Competition, Part I: Sequential Matching," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000199, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Sjaak Hurkensy & Nir Vulkan, 2006. "Dynamic Matching and Bargaining: The Role of Deadlines," OFRC Working Papers Series 2006fe02, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  9. Tanguy, ISAAC, 2006. "Information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings : dynamic case with constant entry flow," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006026, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
  10. Gianni De Fraja & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Walras Retrouve: Decentralized Trading Mechanisms and the Competitive Price," ESE Discussion Papers 36, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution and Efficiency," Game Theory and Information 9403009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2006. "Markets with Bilateral Bargaining and Incomplete Information," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 762, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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