In oligopolistic situations, content protection can have unexpected effects as it changes the nature of inter actions between input suppliers. With a duopoly, it does so in a mann er that makes the foreign firm wish to match price increases and decr eases of the domestic firm. Domestic input suppliers can, therefore, lose from such policies, even when set at free-trade levels. The rela tion between input demands, the form of protection, and the degree of substitution between inputs is shown to define the effects of conten t protection and to provide the basis for understanding who might lob by for protection in different environments. Copyright 1988 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 55 (1988) Issue (Month): 1 (January) Pages: 107-25 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)