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Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents

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Author Info
Fudenberg, Drew
Kreps, David M

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Abstract

Imagine that one player, the "incumbent," competes with several "entrants." Each entrant competes only with the incumbent, but obs erves play in all contests. Previous work shows that as more and more entrants are added, the incumbent's reputation may dominate play of the game, if the entrants are faced in sequence. The authors identify conditions under which similar results obtain when the entrants are faced simultaneously, and they find specifications in which adding mo re simultaneous entrants has a dramatically different effect. They al so show that incumbents need not prefer the situation in which their reputations dominate play to the "informationally isolated" case. Copyright 1987 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 54 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 541-68
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:54:y:1987:i:4:p:541-68

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  1. Dilip Abreu & David Pearce, 2003. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1446, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  2. John R. Conlon, 2005. "Seemingly Unrelated Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 0511004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. John Kennes & Aaron Schiff, 2003. "The Value of a Reputation System," Industrial Organization 0301011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Steffen Huck & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2004. "Reciprocity, Social Ties, and Competition in Markets for Experience Goods," Discussion Papers 04-12, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1999. "The Generalized War of Attrition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 175-189, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Johannes Hörner, . ""Reputation and Competition''," CARESS Working Papres 99-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  7. CASTRO, Rui & COEN-PIRANI, Daniele, 2001. "On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms," Cahiers de recherche 2001-21, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory," Microeconomics 0004009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Bénabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2002. "Willpower and Personal Rules," CEPR Discussion Papers 3143, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1991. "Reputation with multiple relationships: reviving reputation models of debt," Staff Report 137, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  11. Armando Gomes, . "Going Public with Asymmetric Information, Agency Costs, and Dynamic Trading," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 4-99, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research. [Downloadable!]
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