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Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in Continuum Economies

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Hammond, Peter J

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Abstract

A symmetric allocation in a continuum is "multilaterally incentive compatible" if no finite coalition of privately informed agents can manipulate it by combining deception with hidden trades of exchangeable goods. Sufficient conditions for mutilateral compatibility are that all agents face the same linear prices for exchangeable goods and that indistinguishable agents face identical budget sets. The same conditions are necessary under assumptions that extend those under which the second efficiency theorem of welfare economics holds in a continuum economy. Markets for exchangeable goods emerge as binding constraints on the set of Pareto efficient allocations with private information. Copyright 1987 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 54 (1987)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 399-412
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:54:y:1987:i:3:p:399-412

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  1. Hellwig, Martin, 2004. "Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-42, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
  2. Peter J. Hammond & Antonio Villar, . "Efficiency with Non-Convexities: Extending the "Scandinavian Consensus" Approaches," Working Papers 97036, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Luis C. Corchon, 2007. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," Economics Working Papers we081207, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  4. Martin Hellwig, 2004. "Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision and Public-Sector Pricing: A Contribution to the Foundations of Public Economics," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2004_14, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  5. Emmanuel Farhi & Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2007. "A Theory of Liquidity and Regulation of Financial Intermediation," NBER Working Papers 12959, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Rivano, Ricardo de Oliveira & Wallace, Neil, 2006. "New models of old(?) payment questions," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 619, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  7. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1997. "Clearing, settlement, and monetary policy," Working Paper 97-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Blomquist, Sören & Micheletto, Luca, 2003. "Age Related Optimal Income Taxation," Working Paper Series 2003:7, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Gottlieb, Daniel & Maestri, Lucas Jóver, 2004. "Banning information as a redistributive device," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 555, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
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  10. Martin Hellwig, 2006. "The Provision and Pricing of Excludable Public Goods: Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing versus Bundling," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_21, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2006. "Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Insurance Markets," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000445, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Narayana Kocherlakota, 2004. "Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000729, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Peter J. Hammond, . "Multilaterally Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Random Aumann--Hildenbrand Macroeconomies," Working Papers 97022, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Peter J. Hammond, 1999. "Equal Rights to Trade and Mediate," Working Papers 99019, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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