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First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information

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Author Info
Gal-Or, Esther

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Abstract

The author considers a leader-follower game with output quantities as strategies, so as to demonstrate the reduced advantages of the Stackleberg leader in a stochastic environment with private information. At the equilibrium, the strategy of the leader reveals to the follower information about the demand. In an attempt to signal low demand, the leader contracts his output. Nevertheless, unless the leader's information is infinitely noisy, the follower can always correctly infer his signal. The author finds a wide range of parameter values over which the follower is better-off compared to the leader. Copyright 1987 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 54 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 279-92
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:54:y:1987:i:2:p:279-92

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  1. Uday Bhanu Sinha, 2006. "On R&D Information Sharing and Merger," Working papers 145, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Eric Rasmusen & Young-Ro Yoon, 2008. "First versus Second-Mover Advantage with Information Asymmetry about the Size of New Markets," Working Papers 2008-15, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Orlando I. Balboa & Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2001. "Market Structure and the Demand for Free Trade," Working Papers 0112, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Dec 2002. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Xu, Jin, 2007. "Information Advantage In Stackelberg Duopoly Under Demand Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 6408, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Kobayashi, Hajime & Suehiro, Hideo, 2008. "Leadership by Confidence in Teams," MPRA Paper 10717, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  6. Janssen, M.C.W. & Maasland, E., 1997. "On the unique d1 equilibrium in the Stackelberg model with asymmetric information," Discussion Paper 106, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1990. "Capacity, Entry and Forward Induction," Discussion Papers 888, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Zhiyong Liu, 2005. "Stackelberg leadership with demand uncertainty," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(5), pages 345-350. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.

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