The paper presents two models of races in which there is both technological uncertainty and strategic interaction between competitors. The authors' aim is to see how the efforts of competitors in a race vary with the intensity of rivalry between them. In the principal model, which is of a one-dimensional race, it is shown that the leader in the race makes greater efforts than the follower, and efforts increase as the gap between competitors decreases. Under certain conditions the s ame results hold in the second related model, which is of a two-dimensional race. Copyright 1987 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Volume (Year): 54 (1987) Issue (Month): 1 (January) Pages: 1-21 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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