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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 53 (1986)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 447-56
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:53:y:1986:i:3:p:447-56

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