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Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting

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Author Info
Radner, Roy
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File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28198601%2953%3A1%3C43%3ARPGWIM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4&origin=bc
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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 53 (1986)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 43-57
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:53:y:1986:i:1:p:43-57

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  1. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-154, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  2. Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-24, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Joshua Herries & Daniel I. Rees & Jeffrey S. Zax, 2003. "Interdependence in worker productivity," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(5), pages 585-604. [Downloadable!]
  4. David G. Pearce & Dilip Abreu & Paul R. Milgrom, 1988. "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 875, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2005. "Team Incentives in Relational Employment Contracts," Discussion Papers 2005/7, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Richard Damania & Per Fredriksson & Thomas Osang, 2004. "Collusion, Collective Action and Protection: Theory and Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 279-308, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Folk Theorem with Communication," UCLA Economics Online Papers 366, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2001. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-123, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  9. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring and Uniform Sustainability," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-84, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  10. Steven R. Williams & Roy Radner, 1988. "Efficiency in Partnership When The Joint Output is Uncertain," Discussion Papers 760, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  11. W. Bradford & Robert Martin, 2000. "Partnerships, Profit Sharing, and Quality Competition in the Medical Profession," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 193-208, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-242, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 1986. "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 791, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  14. Rudolf Kerschbamer & Muriel Niederle & Josef Perktold, 2000. "Market Institutions and Quality Enforcement," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1482, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  15. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1997. "Private observation and Communication and Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1256, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  16. Flesch, János & Perea, Andrés, 2007. "Repeated Games with Voluntary Information Purchase," Research Memoranda 057, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  17. Jee-Hyeong Park, 2004. "Sustaining Free Trade with Imperfect Private Information about Non-Tariff Barriers," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 736, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  18. Andreas Blume & April Franco, 2002. "Learning from failure," Staff Report 299, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  19. In Lee, 1999. "Non-cooperative Tacit Collusion, Complementary Bidding and Incumbency Premium," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 115-134, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 607, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  21. Ichiro Obara, 2000. "Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1449, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  22. Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 1992. "Efficient and Nearly Efficient Partnerships," Discussion Papers 991R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  23. D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps & E. Maskin, 1998. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 608, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  24. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2007. "Cooperation in knowledge-intensive firms," Discussion Papers 2007/27, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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