Adverse Selection, Repeated Insurance Contracts and Announcement Strategy
AbstractEn Presence de Selection Adverse les Assures Ne Sont Pas Incites a Reveler les Vrais Risques Qu'ils Representent et Il Est Couteux Pour les Assureurs D'observer Ces Risques. Dans Ce Texte, Nous Presentons Deux Strategies Dans Lesquelles L'assureur Utilise L'information Associee a L'experience Passee des Assures. une Strategie Utilise un Mecanisme de Revelation Alors Que L'autre N'utilise Que L'experience Passee Pour Que la Strategie Avec un Mecanisme de Revelation, Contrairement a L'autre Strategie, Permet Toujours D'obtenir une Solution Pareto Optimale Lorsque le Nombre de Periodes Est Tres Grand.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 52 (1985)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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- Dionne, G. & Lasserre, P., 1984. "Adverse Selection, Repeated Insurance Contracts and Announcement Strategy," Cahiers de recherche 8445, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- DIONNE, Georges & LASSERRE, Pierre, . "Adverse selection, repeated insurance contracts and announcement strategy," CORE Discussion Papers RP -658, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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