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Adverse Selection, Repeated Insurance Contracts and Announcement Strategy

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  • Dionne, Georges
  • Lasserre, Pierre

Abstract

En Presence de Selection Adverse les Assures Ne Sont Pas Incites a Reveler les Vrais Risques Qu'ils Representent et Il Est Couteux Pour les Assureurs D'observer Ces Risques. Dans Ce Texte, Nous Presentons Deux Strategies Dans Lesquelles L'assureur Utilise L'information Associee a L'experience Passee des Assures. une Strategie Utilise un Mecanisme de Revelation Alors Que L'autre N'utilise Que L'experience Passee Pour Que la Strategie Avec un Mecanisme de Revelation, Contrairement a L'autre Strategie, Permet Toujours D'obtenir une Solution Pareto Optimale Lorsque le Nombre de Periodes Est Tres Grand.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 52 (1985)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 719-23

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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:52:y:1985:i:4:p:719-23

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Cited by:
  1. Hansen, Bodil O. & Keiding, Hans, 2002. "Alternative health insurance schemes: a welfare comparison," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 739-756, September.
  2. Jean Pinquet & Georges Dionne & Charles Vanasse & Mathieu Maurice, 2007. "Point-record incentives, asymmetric information and dynamic data," Working Papers hal-00243056, HAL.
  3. repec:dgr:uvatin:2001106 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Cowling, Marc, 2007. "The Role of Loan Guarantee Schemes in Alleviating Credit Rationing in the UK," MPRA Paper 1613, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Heski Bar-Isaac & Alejandro Cuñat, 2005. "Long-term debt and hidden borrowing," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24661, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  6. Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1231, CIRPEE.
  7. Tim Friehe, 2008. "Insurance, Pooling, and Resistance to Reform: The Case of Individual Uncertainty," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(18), pages 1-8.
  8. Alma Cohen & Liran Einav, 2007. "Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 745-788, June.
  9. Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, 2009. "Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets," NBER Working Papers 15586, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Maarten C.W. Janssen & Vladimir A. Karamychev, 2001. "Dynamic Insurance and Adverse Selection," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 01-106/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  11. Dionne, Georges & Michaud, Pierre-Carl & Pinquet, Jean, 2013. "A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 85-97.
  12. Bien, Franck & Alary, David, 2006. "Adverse selection and moral hazard in health insurance," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6467, Paris Dauphine University.
  13. Garcia, René, 1986. "La théorie économique de l’information : exposé synthétique de la littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 62(1), pages 88-109, mars.
  14. Alma Cohen, 2008. "Asymmetric Learning in Repeated Contracting: An Empirical Study," NBER Working Papers 13752, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2008:i:18:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Georges Dionne, 2012. "The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud and Dynamic Data," Cahiers de recherche 1233, CIRPEE.

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