Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 49 (1982)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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- David Roland-Holst & Finn Tarp, 2003. "De nouvelles perspectives pour l'efficacité de l'aide," Revue d’économie du développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 17(2), pages 151-180.
- Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "On the Value of Improved Informativeness," Cahiers de recherche 1205, CIRPEE.
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