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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 45 (1978)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
Pages: 575-94
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:45:y:1978:i:3:p:575-94

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