General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 39 (1972)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0034-6527
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Taradas Bandyopadhyay, 2011. "Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 37(4), pages 597-608, October.
- Antonio Quesada, 2002. "Power of Enforcement and Dictatorship," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(4), pages 381-387, June.
- Ehlers, Lars & Storcken, Ton, 2007.
"Oligarchies in Spatial Environments,"
042, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- Ehlers, Lars & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Oligarchies in Spatial Environments," Cahiers de recherche 2007-08, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- EHLERS, Lars & STORCKEN, Ton, 2007. "Oligarchies in Spatial Environments," Cahiers de recherche 09-2007, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Salvador Barbera, 1976.
"The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave 'Too Much' to Chance,"
193, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Barbera, Salvador, 1977. "The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1573-88, October.
- Thomas Schwartz, 2011. "Social choice and individual values in the electronic republic," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 37(4), pages 621-632, October.
- BOSSERT, Walter & SUZUMURA, Kotaro, 2009.
"Quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent relations,"
Cahiers de recherche
2009-05, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura, 2012. "Quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent relations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 323-334, July.
- BOSSERT, Walter & SUZUMURA, Kotaro, 2009. "Quasi-Transitive and Suzumura Consistent Relations," Cahiers de recherche 06-2009, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Yasuhito Tanaka, 2009. "On the computability of quasi-transitive binary social choice rules in an infinite society and the halting problem," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 67-78, May.
- Herrade Igersheim, 2005. "Extending Xu's results to Arrow''s Impossibility Theorem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(13), pages 1-6.
- Olivier Hudry & Bernard Monjardet, 2010.
"Consensus theories : An oriented survey,"
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
10057, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Olivier Hudry & Bernard Monjardet, 2010. "Consensus theories: an oriented survey," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00504974, HAL.
- Geslin, Stephanie & Salles, Maurice & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2003. "Fuzzy aggregation in economic environments: I. Quantitative fuzziness, public goods and monotonicity assumptions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 155-166, April.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2005:i:13:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
- Eraslan, H.Hulya & McLennan, Andrew, 2004. "Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 29-54, July.
- Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim, 2007. "Expérimentation du vote par note et du vote par approbation lors de l'élection présidentielle française du 22 avril 2007," Post-Print halshs-00337290, HAL.
- Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2000. "A trade-off result for preference revelation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 129-141, August.
- Maurice Salles, 2005. "The launching of ‘social choice and welfare’ and the creation of the ‘society for social choice and welfare’," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 557-564, December.
- Julian H. Blau & Donald J. Brown, 1978. "The Structure of Neutral Monotonic Social Functions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 485, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Susumu Cato, 2011. "Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 503-518, October.
- Brandt, Felix & Harrenstein, Paul, 2011. "Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1721-1731, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.