Do Owners Take Better Care of Their Housing Than Renters?
AbstractAccording to conventional wisdom, homeowners take better care of their housing than do renters, as a result of the rental externality. We argue that two forms of homeowner externality ootentially create similar incentives for owners to undermaintain their housing. The first is due to the inability of prospective buyers to fully observe past seller maintenance, and the second is a result of the limited liability of borrowers in the event of mortgage default. Empirical analysis verifies the existence of the mortgage externality, but we find no evidence for the resale externality. Copyright American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association in its journal Real Estate Economics.
Volume (Year): 28 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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