The persistence of excess vacancy has long been documented in the literature. We propose that, because vacant land does not produce income, there is a tendency for developers to build whenever they can identify a development opportunity. Since developers have to compete with each other for the development opportunity, in the aggregate, developers will supply more units than the demand in the market. In the face of an oversupply, we show that, under certain circumstances, developers will not lower the rental rate to eliminate vacancy space. Our model also has implications for investment decisions dealing with projects that could take advantage of existing but not fully utilized assets. Copyright American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association.
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