Wages and Other Determinants of Corruption
AbstractRaising wages has commonly been viewed as an anticorruption policy by policymakers from both governments and multilateral development organizations. Conventional wisdom and recent theoretical work suggest that low wages encourage corruption. Nevertheless, the empirical studies done on the wage- corruption tradeoff are econometric estimates that find no conclusive support for the effectiveness of increasing wages as an anticorruption measure. The unique contributions of this paper are the application of an expected utility model to explain the emergence of corruption, and the use of comparative static results that are consistent with the empirical evidence and useful for the design of anticorruption policies. The most important result from the expected utility model is that anticorruption policies designed to increase the net income of potentially corrupt agents not only may be ineffective but may actually encourage corruption. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004..
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of Development Economics.
Volume (Year): 8 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1363-6669
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- Guenther G. Schulze & Bambang Suharnoko Sjahrir & Nikita Zakharov, 2013. "Corruption in Russia," Discussion Paper Series 22, Department of International Economic Policy, University of Freiburg, revised Apr 2013.
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