Poverty and Governance: The Contest for Aid
AbstractCountries compete with one another for funds distributed by non-government organizations (NGOs). The authors consider a competition over poverty and governance conducted by a non-government organization trying to allocate its funds among potential recipient countries. In its decision-making the NGO also takes into account the initial conditions each potential recipient faces, including the current quality of governance and wealth (poverty). For example, all else being equal the poorer country will have a higher probability of obtaining funds; or, the better the applicant's governance, the more its gains. Moreover, the maximum aid a country can obtain depends on its wealth. Investment in good governance, the wealth/poverty status of the applicant, and its current quality of governance will, together, determine the funds potential recipients expect to obtain. The authors also consider recent changes in the levels of these factors. They want to understand the roles these factors play in the competition for aid and the outcome for the quality of governance. Copyright 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of Development Economics.
Volume (Year): 13 (2009)
Issue (Month): s1 (08)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1363-6669
Other versions of this item:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2006.
"Contests, NGOs, and Decentralizing Aid,"
Review of Development Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 285-296, 05.
- Lahiri, Sajal & Raimondos-Moller, Pascalis, 1997.
"Competition for aid and trade policy,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 43(3-4), pages 369-385, November.
- Sajal Lahiri & Pascalis Raimondos, . "Competition for Aid and Trade Policy," EPRU Working Paper Series 94-12, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Sajal Lahiri and Pascalis Raimondos, . "Competition for Aid and Trade Policy," Economics Discussion Papers 433, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Jac C. Heckelman & Stephen Knack, 2008.
"Foreign Aid and Market-Liberalizing Reform,"
London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 75(299), pages 524-548, 08.
- Svensson, Jakob, 2003. "Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 381-402, April.
- Mavrotas, George & Villanger, Espen, 2006. "Multilateral Aid Agencies and Strategic Donor Behaviour," Working Paper Series DP2006/02, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
- Gil Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "The Politics of Randomness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 423-433, October.
- Brück, Tilman & Xu, Guo, 2012.
"Who gives aid to whom and when? Aid accelerations, shocks and policies,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 593-606.
- Tilman Brück & Guo Xu, 2011. "Who Gives Aid to Whom and When?: Aid Accelerations, Shocks and Policies," Economics of Security Working Paper Series 49, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Tilman Brück & Guo Xu, 2011. "Who Gives Aid to Whom and When?: Aid Accelerations, Shocks and Policies," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1133, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.