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Partial Compliance with Economic Sanctions

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  • Hamid Beladi
  • Reza Oladi

Abstract

By bridging the gap between the strategic model of sanctions and the public choice framework of sanctions, the authors introduce a new sanctions game. Contrary to an earlier finding, they show that the partial compliance of the target country, along with mild sanctions, are not only an equilibrium outcome, but also Pareto superior to non‐compliance and tough economic sanctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Hamid Beladi & Reza Oladi, 2009. "Partial Compliance with Economic Sanctions," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(1), pages 125-133, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:13:y:2009:i:1:p:125-133
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2008.00454.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fiona McGillivray & Allan C. Stam, 2004. "Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(2), pages 154-172, April.
    2. Kaemfer, William H & Lowenberg, Anton D, 1988. "The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 786-793, September.
    3. Biswas, Amit K. & Marjit, Sugata, 2007. "Preferential trade and mis-invoicing: Some analytical implications," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 130-138.
    4. Spindler, Zane A, 1995. "The Public Choice of "Superior" Sanctions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 85(3-4), pages 205-226, December.
    5. Chander, Parkash & Khan, M. Ali, 2001. "International treaties on trade and global pollution," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 303-324, December.
    6. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 1999. "Same Song, Same Refrain? Economic Sanctions in the 1990's," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 403-408, May.
    7. Richard D. Farmer, 2000. "Costs of Economic Sanctions to the Sender," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 93-117, January.
    8. Elliott, Kimberly Ann & Uimonen, Peter P., 1993. "The effectiveness of economic sanctions with application to the case of Iraq," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 403-409, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Saeed Ghasseminejad & Mohammad R. Jahan-Parvar, 2020. "The Impact of Financial Sanctions: The Case of Iran 2011-2016," International Finance Discussion Papers 1281, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    2. Beladi, Hamid & Oladi, Reza, 2015. "On smart sanctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 24-27.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior

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