This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Buying Influence: Aid Fungibility in a Strategic Perspective

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Rune Jansen Hagen

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

I study equilibria of non-cooperative games between an aid donor and a recipient when there is conflict over the allocation of their combined budgets. The general conclusion is that a donor's influence over outcomes is increasing in the share of the available resources it controls; if this share is large enough, aid fungibility is not important as the donor achieves its most preferred allocation. The game-theoretic approach to fungibility is contrasted with the traditional non-strategic approach. I argue that the former is superior as it derives final allocations instead of assuming them, making analysis of the sources of influence over outcomes possible. Copyright © 2006 The Author; Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2006.00317.x
File Format: text/html
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Development Economics.

Volume (Year): 10 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (05)
Pages: 267-284
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:10:y:2006:i:2:p:267-284

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1363-6669

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=1363-6669

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Sanjay Jain, 2007. "Project Assistance versus Budget Support: An Incentive-Theoretic Analysis of Aid Conditionality," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 143(4), pages 694-719, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Hagen, Rune Jansen, 2004. "Foreign Aid and Domestic Politics Implications for Aid Selectivity," Working Papers 04-12, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N Gang, 2006. "The Hope for Hysteresis in Foreign Aid," Departmental Working Papers 200628, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can include your works in the database easily by uploading them on the Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) if you do not have access to an institutional RePEc archive.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.