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Elections, Opportunism, Partisanship and Sovereign Ratings in Developing Countries Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Paul M. Vaaler
Burkhard N. Schrage
Steven A. Block
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We empirically examine whether and how opportunistic and partisan political business cycle ("PBC") considerations explain election-period decisions by credit rating agencies ("agencies") publishing developing country sovereign risk-ratings ("ratings"). Analyses of 391 agency ratings for 19 countries holding 39 presidential elections from 1987-2000, initially suggest that elections themselves prompt rating downgrades consistent with opportunistic PBC considerations, that incumbents are all likely to implement election-period policies detrimental to post-election creditworthiness. But more refined analyses, integrating both opportunistic and partisan PBC considerations in a unified framework, suggest that election-period agency downgrades (upgrades) are more likely as right-wing (left-wing) incumbents, become more vulnerable to ouster by challengers. Together, these results underscore the importance of integrating both opportunistic and partisan PBC considerations into any explanation of election-period risk assessments of agencies and, perhaps, other private, foreign-based financial actors important to the pricing and allocation of capital for lending and investment in the developing world. Copyright © 2006 The Authors; Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Development Economics .
Volume (Year): 10 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
Pages: 154-170
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Handle: RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:10:y:2006:i:1:p:154-170Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1363-6669
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Vaaler, Paul M., 2006.
"Electoral Politics and Foreign Project Investment in Developing Countries ,"
Working Papers
06-0125, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
[Downloadable!]
Vaaler, Paul M. & James, Barclay E. & Aguilera, Ruth V., 2006.
"Risk and Capital Structure in Asian Project Finance ,"
Working Papers
06-0127, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
[Downloadable!]
Paul Vaaler & Barclay James & Ruth Aguilera, 2008.
"Risk and capital structure in Asian project finance ,"
Asia Pacific Journal of Management ,
Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 25-50, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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