Direkte Demokratie, Steuermoral und Steuerhinterziehung: Erfahrungen aus der Schweiz
AbstractFirst it is clarified what„trust”and„tax morale”actually mean and how they are measured. Especially in German-speaking countries, tax morale is often mixed with tax compliance. But the first is a moral conviction while the second denotes actual behaviour, and both do not necessarily need to be congruent. Then it is shown how direct popular rights empower Swiss citizens to influence their tax burden. Finally, we discuss the impact of direct popular rights on tax morale and on tax compliance as well as the impact of the trust between citizens and tax authorities on the latter. It is shown that direct democracy leads to higher tax morale and compliance, even if tax morale is today rather low in Switzerland compared to other countries. Copyright 2007 die Autoren Journal compilation 2007, Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Volume (Year): 8 (2007)
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