Die eigentümliche Diskussion um Zentralisierung und Dezentralisierung in der Europapolitik
AbstractThis paper deals with the peculiar discussion around centralization and decentralization in the European Union. It is argued that large parts of this discussion rest on a flawed analogy of the liberal concept of normative individualism on the one hand and the concept of political decentralization in federal multi-layer systems on the other. Based on this flawed analogy an unusual and partly misleading notion of decentralization has widely been used in the discussion of European Integration. As a result, there are a number of misjudgements in some central topics of European Integration. These topics are the question of institutional competition among governments, the effects of fiscal competition on the tax burden of citizens and a future European constitution. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2004
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Verein für Socialpolitik in its journal Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik.
Volume (Year): 5 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1465-6493
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Caplan, Bryan, 2001. " Standing Tiebout on His Head: Tax Capitalization and the Monopoly Power of Local Governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 108(1-2), pages 101-22, July.
- repec:mea:ivswpa:456 is not listed on IDEAS
- Vaubel, Roland, 1994. " The Political Economy of Centralization and the European Community," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(1-2), pages 151-90, October.
- Demsetz, Harold, 1969. "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, April.
- Eggert, Wolfgang, 2001. "Capital tax competition with socially wasteful government consumption," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 517-529, September.
- Michael Marlow, 1992. "Intergovernmental competition, voice and exit options and the design of fiscal structure," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 73-88, December.
- Wrede, Matthias, 1998. "Household mobility and the moderate leviathan: Efficiency and decentralization," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 315-328, May.
- Edwards, Jeremy & Keen, Michael, 1996.
"Tax competition and Leviathan,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 113-134, January.
- SALMON, Pierre, 1987.
"Decentralization as an incentive scheme,"
Institut des MathÃ©matiques Economiques â Document de travail de lâI.M.E. (1974-1993)
98, Institut des Mathématiques Economiques. LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
- Apolte, Thomas, 2001. " How Tame Will Leviathan Become in Institutional Competition? Competition among Governments in the Provision of Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(3-4), pages 359-81, June.
- Wrede, Matthias, 2001. "Yardstick competition to tame the Leviathan," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 705-721, November.
- Di Fabio, Udo, 2001. "Der Verfassungsstaat in der Weltgesellschaft," Beiträge zur Ordnungstheorie und Ordnungspolitik, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen & Walter Eucken Institut, Freiburg, Germany, edition 1, volume 127, number urn:isbn:9783161476129.
- Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September.
- Thomas Apolte, 1997. "Secession Clauses: A Tool for the Taming of an Arising Leviathan in Brussels?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 57-70, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.