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Hochschulzulassungen in Deutschland: Wem hilft die Reform durch das „Dialogorientierte Serviceverfahren“?

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  • Frank Hüber
  • Dorothea Kübler

Abstract

Seit Jahren hat das dezentrale System der Hochschulzulassung in Deutschland aufgrund von Mehrfachzulassungen bis lange nach Semesterbeginn mit dem Problem unbesetzter Studienplätze zu kämpfen eines der typischen Probleme dezentraler Zuordnungsverfahren. Langwierige Nachrückverfahren verzögern die Besetzung freier Studienplätze teils um mehrere Monate, obwohl die Hochschulen auf diese Problematik bereits mit einem starken Überbuchen der Studiengänge reagiert haben. Das Dialogorientierte Serviceverfahren, dessen Manipulationsanreize, Stabilitäts- und Effizienzeigenschaften von uns betrachtet werden, soll diese Probleme zukünftig beseitigen und hat durchaus das Potential die gegenwärtige Situation entscheidend zu verbessern. Dennoch konnten Schwachstellen identifiziert werden, die ausgeräumt werden sollten. -- The deregulation of the German market for university admissions has led to a number of typical problems of decentralized matching markets such as multiple applications, late rejections of offers, and universities unable to fill all their spaces. Unraveling, inefficiencies and risks for both sides of the market arise. Therefore a new centralized admissions procedure has been agreed upon. We discuss the new mechanism with its strengths and shortcomings. Overall, the centralized procedure allows universities to select their most preferred students, and is likely to improve upon the current situation. However, some weaknesses can be identified that should be addressed.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Verein für Socialpolitik in its journal Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik.

Volume (Year): 12 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 430-444

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Handle: RePEc:bla:perwir:v:12:y:2011:i:4:p:430-444

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  1. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sonmez, 2008. "Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1636-52, September.
  2. Roth, Alvin, 2008. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," Scholarly Articles 2579651, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  3. Braun, Sebastian & Dwenger, Nadja & Kübler, Dorothea, 2007. "Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off: An Empirical Study of Centralised University Admissions in Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 3261, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Alistair Wilson & Federico Echenique & Leeat Yariv, 2009. "Clearinghouses for Two-Sided Matching: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 487, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2013.
  5. Joana Pais & Ágnes Pintér, 2006. "School Choice and Information An Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms," Working Papers Department of Economics 2006/14, ISEG - School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, University of Lisbon.
  6. Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 608-27, June.
  7. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August.
  8. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "Can Pre-arranged Matches Be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 148-156, May.
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