A Model of Wage Bargaining
AbstractAn equation for earnings is derived from the assumption that wage increases are determined in a process of negotiation bet ween union and firm. The union is taken to be concerned about real wa ge, the firm about its real profit. The goods market is perfectly com petitive. The empirical work supported the hypothesis. The data sugge sted that employees' concerns have more influence on the outcome than employers'. The levels of profits and the real wage both played a ro le in explaining wage increases. The change in unemployment was found relevant to the outcome as well as the level. Copyright 1987 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Oxford in its journal Oxford Bulletin of Economics & Statistics.
Volume (Year): 49 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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- Blanchflower, D. & Oswald, A., 1989.
"The Wage Curve,"
340, London School of Economics - Centre for Labour Economics.
- Blanchflower, David G & Oswald, Andrew J & Garrett, Mario D, 1990.
"Insider Power in Wage Determination,"
London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 57(226), pages 143-70, May.
- Blanchflower, D. & Oswald, A. & Garrett, M., 1988. "Insider Power In Wage Determination," Papers 319, London School of Economics - Centre for Labour Economics.
- David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald & Mario D. Garrett, 1989. "Insider Power in Wage Determination," NBER Working Papers 3179, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Roger Bjørnstad & Ragnar Nymoen, 1999. "Wage and Profitability: Norwegian Manufacturing 1967-1998," Discussion Papers 259, Research Department of Statistics Norway.
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