Empirical studies in family economics usually rely on questionnaires, statistical data or panel data. Here we try to study experimentally some crucial aspects of engaging in a marriage. The female partner can end the relationship or suggest one of two forms of joint venture where more labor division makes her more exploitable by her partner. More specifically, the random profit of the joint venture is allocated by ultimatum bargaining in the case of a full engagement whereas marriage bargaining is procedurally fair in the case of a low engagement. Our treatment variables are her and his outside options representing different attitudes to investing in human capital. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Metroeconomica.
Volume (Year): 55 (2004) Issue (Month): 1 (02) Pages: 1-21 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
plain text,
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote),
ReDIF
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)