International Outsourcing And Welfare Reduction: An Entry-Deterrence Story
AbstractWe show that international outsourcing may reduce welfare of the outsourcing country by deterring market entry, thus showing a new effect which is different from the employment and the quality effects creating negative impacts of outsourcing. Entry deterrence under outsourcing reduces domestic welfare if both the profit extraction and cost saving from outsourcing are sufficiently small. Copyright � 2010 The Authors. The Manchester School � 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Manchester in its journal The Manchester School.
Volume (Year): 78 (2010)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
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- Arijit Mukherjee & Yingyi Tsai, . "International Outsourcing and Welfare Reduction: an Entry-deterrence Story," Discussion Papers 08/45, University of Nottingham, GEP.
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