The analysis in this paper uncovers a heretofore unrecognized connection between the degree of competitive behavior in the product market and the preferred patent licensing mechanism. Using conjectural variations as a shorthand for several different supergame outcomes of a duopoly industry, we show that both the degree of competitive behavior and the extent of the asymmetries in the behavior of the firms in the market have a non-trivial effect on the patent licensing mechanism preferred by an external patentee. The relationship between the degree of competition in product markets and the preferred patent licensing mechanism, to the best of our knowledge, has not been addressed in the literature previously and represents a useful source of new empirical implications. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester, 2005.
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