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Monetary Union: The Ins and Outs of Strategic Delegation

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  • Levine, Paul
  • Pearlman, Joseph

Abstract

This paper addresses the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy in a closed trading bloc consisting of "ins" forming a monetary union and "outs" who retain monetary sovereignty. All governments, however, can opt for a particular choice of institutional arrangement for their central bank and delegate monetary policy to central banks with varying degrees of independence or equivalently "conservatism". This paper examines the outcome when these decisions are individually rational for governments and are taken strategically, taking into account the intracountry interactions between fiscal authorities and their own central banks, and the inter-country interactions between the same players. Copyright 2001 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Manchester in its journal Manchester School.

Volume (Year): 69 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 285-309

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Handle: RePEc:bla:manchs:v:69:y:2001:i:3:p:285-309

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Cited by:
  1. Xavier Debrun, 2000. "Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 323-358, October.
  2. Marco Catenaro, 2000. "Macroeconomic Policy Interactions in the EMU: A Case for Fiscal Policy Co-ordination," School of Economics Discussion Papers, School of Economics, University of Surrey 0003, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
  3. Francesca Castellani, 2001. "Central Bank Independence and Accountability Under Complete Information," IHEID Working Papers, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies 05-2001, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
  4. Roel Beetsma & Xavier Debrun & Frank Klaassen, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," CESifo Working Paper Series 599, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Francesca Castellani & Xavier Debrun, 2001. "Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions," IMF Working Papers 01/205, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Fritz Breuss & Andrea Weber, 1999. "Economic Policy Coordination in the EMU: Implications for the Stability Pact," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS) 26, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
  7. René Cabral-Torres, . "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Coordination," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York 05/28, Department of Economics, University of York.

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