This paper develops a theoretical model in which the level of training provided by a firm is not observed by workers. It is therefore not possible to have training wages completely contingent upon the level of training provided. Training wages will be too high. This, in turn, prevents firms from recouping the full benefits from training and leads to underinvestment. The more general the training, the more severe this underinvestment problem. Copyright 2005 CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Article provided by CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd in its journal LABOUR.
Volume (Year): 19 (2005) Issue (Month): 4 (December) Pages: 655-671 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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