Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

A Price Is a Signal: on Intrinsic Motivation, Crowding-out, and Crowding-in

Contents:

Author Info

  • Friedel Bolle
  • Philipp E. Otto

Abstract

If a previously unpaid activity (e.g. donating blood) is paid, then we often observe that this activity is reduced. In this paper, it is hypothesized that the price offered is taken as a proxy for the "value" of the activity. Depending on how the actor valued the activity previously, crowding-out or crowding-in is implied, an effect with or without persistence after stopping the payment. The model can be adapted to a number of similar situations, including those where a high price signals high costs instead of high values. Our "naïve" explanation is confronted with Bènabou and Tirole's (2003) Principal-Agent model. A questionnaire study supports our basic hypothesis as well as some of the derived consequences, and contradicts Bènabou and Tirole's model. Copyright � 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6435.2010.00458.x
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Kyklos.

Volume (Year): 63 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
Pages: 9-22

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:63:y:2010:i:1:p:9-22

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0023-5962

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Otto, Ilona M. & Wechsung, Frank, 2014. "The effects of rules and communication in a behavioral irrigation experiment with power asymmetries carried out in North China," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 10-20.
  2. Antoine Beretti & Charles Figuières & Gilles Grolleau, 2013. "Using Money to Motivate Both ‘Saints’ and ‘Sinners’: a Field Experiment on Motivational Crowding-Out," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 63-77, 02.
  3. Bruno, Bruna, 2011. "Rewarding my Self. Self Esteem, Self Determination and Motivations," MPRA Paper 32218, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Winschel, Evguenia & Zahn, Philipp, 2014. "When Ignorance is Bliss* : Information Asymmetries Enhance Prosocial Behavior in Dicator Games," Working Papers 13-07, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
  5. Winschel, Evguenia & Zahn, Philipp, 2012. "Effciency Concern under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 13-07, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
  6. Bruno, B., 2010. "Rewarding my Self. The role of Self Esteem and Self Determination in Motivation Crowding Theory," MPRA Paper 23117, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Bruno, Bruna, 2012. "Reconciling economics and psychology on intrinsic motivation," MPRA Paper 42717, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:63:y:2010:i:1:p:9-22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.