Are Inventories a Buffer Against Weak Legal Systems?
AbstractWeak legal enforcement of contracts leads to inefficient breach and an overall increase in breaches for firms and individuals. We suggest that firms use inventory holdings as a means to counteract weak contract enforcement. We test the hypothesis that firms operating in weak legal environments have a higher ratio of inventories to net sales than firms operating in strong legal environments. Empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis using data from over three hundred comparable firms from fourteen product groups across thirty-nine countries is presented. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd..
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Kyklos.
Volume (Year): 60 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962
Other versions of this item:
- A.V. Raja & Hans-Bernd Schäfer, . "Are Inventories A Buffer Against Weak Legal Systems?," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2004-1-1089, Berkeley Electronic Press.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kahn, James A, 1987. "Inventories and the Volatility of Production," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 667-79, September.
- Bental, B. & Eden, B., 1992.
"Inventories in a Competitive Environment,"
92-19, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Martin Brown & Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr, 2004.
"Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions,"
Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 747-780, 05.
- Brown, Martin & Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst, 2003. "Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions," IZA Discussion Papers 897, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 2002. "Relational Contracts And The Theory Of The Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pages 39-84, February.
- Scheinkman, Jose A & Schechtman, Jack, 1983. "A Simple Competitive Model with Production and Storage," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 427-41, July.
- Sebastián Fleitas & Andrés Rius & Carolina Román & Henry Willebald, 2013. "Contract enforcement, investment and growth in Uruguay since 1870," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 13-01, Instituto de Economia - IECON.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.