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A Market for Time Fairness and Efficiency in Waiting Lines

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  • Felix Oberholzer‐Gee

Abstract

In situations of excess demand, many firms use waiting lists to allocate products and services among their customers. The resulting allocation is likely to be inefficient, creating opportunities for Pareto improving trades among those who are waiting in line. Yet, in the queuing context, the trading of places is rare and inefficiencies often persist over time. In this paper, I report the results of a field experiment which allows randomly selected customers to earn up to $10 for letting a stranger cut in line. The higher the offer, the more likely it is that individuals let someone cut in. But while a majority agrees to wait longer, only a small minority accepts the monetary reward. Trading in this market is constrained by multiple social concerns. The obligation not to exploit situations of excess demand and efficiency considerations influence the willingness to let a stranger jump the queue.

Suggested Citation

  • Felix Oberholzer‐Gee, 2006. "A Market for Time Fairness and Efficiency in Waiting Lines," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 427-440, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:59:y:2006:i:3:p:427-440
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.2006.00340.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Élisabeth Tovar & Mathieu Bunel, 2023. "Fairness of the First-Come, First-Served rule on the rental housing market: answers from a hypothetical survey experiment," EconomiX Working Papers 2023-31, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    2. Charles Raux & Stéphanie Souche & Yves Croissant, 2009. "How fair is pricing perceived to be? An empirical study," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 227-240, April.
    3. William P. Barnett & Daniel A. Levinthal, 2017. "Special Issue Introduction: Evolutionary Logics of Strategy and Organization," Strategy Science, INFORMS, vol. 2(1), pages 1-1, March.
    4. Henk Folmer & Auke Leen, 2013. "Why do successful restaurants not raise their prices?," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 81-90, July.
    5. Ryan W. Buell, 2021. "Last-Place Aversion in Queues," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 1430-1452, March.
    6. Sezer Ülkü & Chris Hydock & Shiliang Cui, 2022. "Social Queues (Cues): Impact of Others’ Waiting in Line on One’s Service Time," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(11), pages 7958-7976, November.
    7. Luyi Yang & Laurens Debo & Varun Gupta, 2017. "Trading Time in a Congested Environment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(7), pages 2377-2395, July.
    8. Ryan W. Buell, 2017. "Last Place Aversion in Queues," Harvard Business School Working Papers 18-053, Harvard Business School, revised Oct 2019.
    9. Dold, Malte & Khadjavi, Menusch, 2017. "Jumping the queue: An experiment on procedural preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 127-137.
    10. Gad Allon & Eran Hanany, 2012. "Cutting in Line: Social Norms in Queues," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(3), pages 493-506, March.

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