Getting along with Colleagues - Does Profit Sharing Help or Hurt?
AbstractTheory presents two channels through which profit sharing can cause workers to increase their coworkers' productivity: greater cooperation and increased peer pressure. This paper argues that these generate opposite influences on coworker relations, and that which dominates varies according to circumstances and type of worker. Using German data, we show that, for non-supervisory men, profit sharing increases cooperation, but that for those who highly value success on the job, it has no influence on cooperation, and for supervisors it reduces cooperation. Moreover, the findings show striking gender differences in the effect of profit sharing. We contend these patterns fit with underlying theoretical expectations. Copyright 2005 Blackwell Publishing Ltd..
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Kyklos.
Volume (Year): 58 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Derek C. Jones & Srecko Goic, 2010. "Do Innovative Workplace Practices Foster Mutual Gains? Evidence From Croatia," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp993, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Dur, Robert & Sol, Joeri, 2010.
"Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 293-301, July.
- Dur, Robert & Sol, Joeri, 2009. "Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 4532, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Robert Dur & Joeri Sol, 2008. "Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-094/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 03 Aug 2009.
- Robert Dur & Joeri Sol, 2008. "Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 2476, CESifo Group Munich.
- Douglas L. Kruse & Richard B. Freeman & Joseph R. Blasi, 2010.
"Do Workers Gain by Sharing? Employee Outcomes under Employee Ownership, Profit Sharing, and Broad-Based Stock Options,"
in: Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options, pages 257-289
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Douglas Kruse & Richard Freeman & Joseph Blasi, 2008. "Do Workers Gain by Sharing? Employee Outcomes under Employee Ownership, Profit Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options," NBER Working Papers 14233, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Colin Green & J S Heywood, 2008.
"Profit Sharing and the Quality of Relations with the Boss,"
596078, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
- Green, Colin P. & Heywood, John S., 2010. "Profit sharing and the quality of relations with the boss," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 859-867, October.
- Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2007.
"Cooperation in knowledge-intensive firms,"
2007/27, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics.
- John Heywood & Uwe Jirjahn & Georgi Tsertsvadze, 2005. "Does profit sharing reduce conflict with the boss? Evidence from Germany," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(2), pages 235-250.
- Michelle Brown & John Heywood, 2009.
"Helpless in Finance: The Cost of Helping Effort Among Bank Employees,"
Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination,
Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 176-195, June.
- Michelle Brown & John Heywood, 2009. "Helpless in Finance: The Cost of Helping Effort Among Bank Employees," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 176-195, June.
- Thomas Cornelissen & John S. Heywood & Uwe Jirjahn, 2010.
"Profit Sharing and Reciprocity: Theory and Survey Evidence,"
SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research
292, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
- Thomas Cornelissen & John S. Heywood & Uwe Jirjahn, 2010. "Profit Sharing and Reciprocity: Theory and Survey Evidence," Research Papers in Economics 2010-04, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
- Colin Green & J S Heywood, 2007. "Performance pay, sorting and the dimensions of job satisfaction," Working Papers 584041, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
- Natalia Montinari, 2011. "The Dark Side of Reciprocity," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-052, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Colin Green & J S Heywood, 2007. "Does profit sharing increase training by reducing turnover?," Working Papers 589032, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.