Theory presents two channels through which profit sharing can cause workers to increase their coworkers' productivity: greater cooperation and increased peer pressure. This paper argues that these generate opposite influences on coworker relations, and that which dominates varies according to circumstances and type of worker. Using German data, we show that, for non-supervisory men, profit sharing increases cooperation, but that for those who highly value success on the job, it has no influence on cooperation, and for supervisors it reduces cooperation. Moreover, the findings show striking gender differences in the effect of profit sharing. We contend these patterns fit with underlying theoretical expectations. Copyright 2005 Blackwell Publishing Ltd..
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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Kyklos.
Volume (Year): 58 (2005) Issue (Month): 4 (November) Pages: 557-573 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2007.
"Cooperation in knowledge-intensive firms,"
Discussion Papers
2007/27, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration.
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