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When Tax Collectors Become Collectors for Child Support and Student Loans: Jeopardizing the Revenue Base?


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  • Eliza Ahmed
  • Valerie Braithwaite
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    Cet article étudie la relation entre des payements additionnels à l'état pour financer les prêts aux étudiants (dans le cadre du Higher Education Contribution Scheme) et les contributions alimentaires pour enfants (dans le cadre du Child Support Scheme) et la complaisance fiscale. Les données sont dérivées du 'Community Hopes, Fears, and Actions Survey' qui est basé sur un échantillon de 2040 individus. Il est démontré que les payements additionnels posent aux autorités un problème de complaisance fiscale. En même temps, cette étude montre que le degré de dissuasion perçu, l'obligation morale et la fiabilité jouent un rôle primordial dans la réduction de l'évasion fiscale. Un résultat important de cette étude est qu'il est plus probable que les payements additionnels s'accompagnent d'évasion fiscale lorsque revenu et foi en les normes sont faibles. Le fait que l'évasion fiscale est plus importante dans des groupes économiquement défavorisés a déjàété relevé en d'autres circonstances, mais l'effet adverse d'avoir été irrémédiablement marginalisé par les autorités légales a jusqu'à présent été aussi bien sous-évalué que trop peu analysé théoriquement. Copyright WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG 2004.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Kyklos.

    Volume (Year): 57 (2004)
    Issue (Month): 3 (08)
    Pages: 303-326

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:57:y:2004:i:3:p:303-326

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    Cited by:
    1. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2006. "Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-10, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    2. James Alm & Chandler McClellan, 2012. "Tax Morale and Tax Compliance from the Firm's Perspective," Working Papers 1211, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
    3. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2007. "Tax Evasion, Tax Amnesties and the Psychological Tax Contract," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0729, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    4. Coricelli, Giorgio & Rusconi, Elena & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2014. "Tax evasion and emotions: An empirical test of re-integrative shaming theory," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 49-61.
    5. Wolfram F. Richter & Berthold U. Wigger, 2012. "Besteuerung des Humanvermögens," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 13(1-2), pages 82-102, 02.


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