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Rent Seeking into the Income Distribution

Author

Listed:
  • William F. Shughart II
  • Robert D. Tollison
  • Zhipeng Yan

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • William F. Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison & Zhipeng Yan, 2003. "Rent Seeking into the Income Distribution," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 441-456, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:56:y:2003:i:4:p:441-456
    DOI: 10.1046/j.0023-5962.2003.00232.x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Vitor Melo & Elijah Neilson, 2023. "Introducing an index of rent seeking: a synthetic matching approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(3), pages 471-487, December.
    2. Tarkan Cavusoglu & Oguzhan Dincer, 2015. "Does decentralization reduce income inequality? Only in rich states," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(1), pages 285-306, July.
    3. Ismail M. Cole, 2023. "The political economy triangle of government spending, interest‐group influence, and income inequality: Evidence and implications from the US states," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(3), pages 1122-1176, November.
    4. Cole, Ismail M. & Agiobenebo, Tamunopriye J., 2022. "Special interest groups, labor market regulations, and labor market performance in the U.S. states," EconStor Preprints 265087, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    5. Dennis Coates & Jac Heckelman & Bonnie Wilson, 2007. "Determinants of interest group formation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 377-391, December.
    6. Robert F. Salvino & Gregory M. Randolph & Geoffrey K. Turnbull & Michael T. Tasto, 2019. "The effects of decentralization on special interest groups," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 191-213, December.
    7. Domenico Rossignoli, 2015. "Too many and too much? Special-interest groups and inequality at the turn of the century," Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, vol. 130(3), pages 337-366.
    8. Vitor Melo & Stephen Miller, 2022. "Estimating the Effect of Rent-Seeking on income distribution: an analysis of U.S. States and Counties," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 99-114, July.
    9. Theresa Hager, 2020. "Special Interest Groups and Growth: A Meta-Analysis of Mancur Olsons Theory," ICAE Working Papers 116, Johannes Kepler University, Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy.
    10. Axel Dreher & Lars-H. Siemers, 2009. "The nexus between corruption and capital account restrictions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 245-265, July.
    11. Csaba, László, 2006. "A stabilitási és növekedési egyezmény új politikai gazdaságtanáról [On the new political economy of the Stability and Growth Pact]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 1-30.
    12. Murray, Cameron, 2020. "Do political donations buy reputation in an elite gift-exchange game?," OSF Preprints fc9rt, Center for Open Science.
    13. Ismail M. Cole, 2015. "Interest group activity and economic growth: some new evidence from the US states," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(10), pages 825-829, July.
    14. Syed Toqueer Akhter & Fahad Manzoor, 2015. "Openness of Economy, Foreign Investment Inflows and the Phenomenon of Rent Seeking Corruption," Eurasian Journal of Economics and Finance, Eurasian Publications, vol. 3(3), pages 45-64.
    15. Tim Wegenast, 2010. "Uninformed Voters for Sale: Electoral Competition, Information and Interest Groups in the US," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 271-300, May.
    16. Chambers, Dustin & O'Reilly, Colin, 2022. "Regulation and income inequality in the United States," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    17. Dustin Chambers & Colin O’Reilly, 2022. "The economic theory of regulation and inequality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 193(1), pages 63-78, October.
    18. Fuad Hasanov & Oded Izraeli, 2011. "Income Inequality, Economic Growth, And The Distribution Of Income Gains: Evidence From The U.S. States," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 518-539, August.
    19. repec:wly:soecon:v:82:1:y:2015:p:285-306 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Cameron K Murray, 2014. "Resolving rent-seeking puzzles: A model of political influence via social signals," Discussion Papers Series 528, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    21. Tarkan Cavusoglu & Oguzhan Dincer, 2015. "Does decentralization reduce income inequality? Only in rich states," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 285-306, July.
    22. Murray, Cameron K., 2012. "Markets in political influence: rent-seeking, networks and groups," MPRA Paper 42070, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    23. Dustin Chambers & Patrick A. McLaughlin & Laura Stanley, 2019. "Barriers to prosperity: the harmful impact of entry regulations on income inequality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(1), pages 165-190, July.

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