Phasing Out Sector-Specific Regulation in Competitive Telecommunications
AbstractAfter overall entry deregulation, regulation of market power can only be justified in local telecommunication networks as long as they constitute monopolistic bottlenecks. Technical progress leads to a gradual disappearance of monopolistic bottlenecks, pointing out the large potential for economically efficient phasing out of sector-specific regulation. In contrast, all forms of asymmetric regulation contain an intrinsic bias towards overregulation. The new telecommunications laws in Germany and Switzerland are shown to be prominent examples of asymmetric regulatory frameworks, whereby the Swiss law seems more suitable for phasing out sector-specific regulation. Copyright 1997 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Kyklos.
Volume (Year): 50 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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