Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Commitment Rather Than Independence: An Institutional Design for Reducing the Inflationary Bias of Monetary Policy

Contents:

Author Info

  • Prast, Henriette M

Abstract

This paper distinguishes between central bank independence and central bank commitment. Independent central banks are free to choose their policy goals and instruments, whereas committed central banks are limited in their behavior with the goal of price stability. It is argued that for political and economic reasons commitment is to be preferred over independence. For sixteen industrial countries, the central banks are ranked according to their degree of central bank independence and to their degree of commitment. The empirical evidence does not indicate a significant relationship between independence, whereas a commitment strategy, which does not require institutional changes, lowers inflation without affecting output. Copyright 1996 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Kyklos.

Volume (Year): 49 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 377-405

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:49:y:1996:i:3:p:377-405

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0023-5962

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. James Forder, 2002. "Interests and 'Independence': The European Central Bank and the theory of bureaucracy," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 51-69.
  2. James Forder, 2000. "Traps in the Measurement of Independence and Accountability of Central Banks," Economics Series Working Papers 23, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  3. H. Prast, 1998. "Inflation, distortionary taxation and the design of monetary policy: the role of social cohesion," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 51(204), pages 37-53.
  4. H.M. Prast, 1996. "Inflation, unemployment and the position of the central bank: the opinion of the public," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 49(199), pages 415-454.
  5. H.M. Prast, 1996. "Inflation, unemployment and the position of the central bank: the opinion of the public," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 49(199), pages 415-454.
  6. Andreas Freytag, 2001. "Does central bank independence reflect monetary commitment properly? Methodical considerations," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 54(217), pages 181-208.
  7. H. Prast, 1998. "Inflation, distortionary taxation and the design of monetary policy: the role of social cohesion," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 51(204), pages 37-53.
  8. Cem Mehmet Baydur & Bora Suslu & Selahattin Bekmez, 2004. "The independence of central bank in view of Rogoff: The Turkish experience," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(1-2), pages 143-.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:49:y:1996:i:3:p:377-405. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.