The authors present design and results of the 'Passauer Wahlborse,' a field experiment built on call market institution, which successfully predicted the outcome of the 1994 German Bundestag election. Building on theoretical and experimental literature, they discuss the determinants of individual trading behavior in a field environment and point at difficulties in analyzing the data generated by political market experiments. While previous explanations for the predictive success of these markets--i.e., the 'marginal trader hypothesis'--do not appear wholly convincing, the authors proffer an alternative that focuses on information costs and show that their findings are consistent with basic tenets from information economics. Copyright 1996 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Kyklos.
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