Why is there only partial deregulation of telecommunications in Germany and extensive deregulation in the United States? Purely economic reasons (e.g., economies of scale) are shown to be unsuitable for explaining the difference. A political-economic approach is then presented. In Germany, decisions on deregulation are centralized on the federal level, whereas they are distributed on the federal and state level in the United States. As a consequence, a different interest group representation is prevailing--promoting deregulation in the United States and impeding deregulation in Germany. Obstacles might be overcome in a compensation scheme embodying entry taxes and price subsidies. Copyright 1989 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Kyklos.