The Economics of Crime and the Sociology of Deviant Behaviour: A Theoretical Confrontation of Basic Propositions
AbstractIt is first demonstrated that the sociological principle of differential association can be deduced from the economic theory of crime. Proceeding from the assumption that sanctioning situations can be modeled as chicken or prisoner's dilemma games, hypotheses are suggested to criticize hypotheses on sanctioning by advocates of the sociological labeling approach. Proceeding from the economic theory of crime, it is shown under what conditions the assumption of the labeling approach that delinquents are forced into a criminal career by punishment holds true. Finally, problems of the economic theory of crime and a potential integration with sociological hypotheses are discussed. Copyright 1989 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Kyklos.
Volume (Year): 42 (1989)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962
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- Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2011.
"Econometric Estimates of Deterrence of the Death Penalty: Facts or Ideology?,"
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 448-478, 08.
- Kirchgässner, Gebhard, 2011. "Econometric Estimates of Deterrence of the Death Penalty: Facts or Ideology," Economics Working Paper Series 1115, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
- Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2011. "Econometric Estimates of Deterrence of the Death Penalty: Facts or Ideology?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3443, CESifo Group Munich.
- Numa Garoupa, 1999. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Dissemination of Information," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 183-196, May.
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