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The Evolution of Property Rights

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Author Info
Field, Barry C
Abstract

A model of the "optimal commons" shows how property tenures result from the interaction of transactions costs among those people using a resource in common and the costs of excluding noncommoners. The model shows that, under some circumstances, demographic and economic growth will induce a change toward individual property, while under other circumstances, growth can lead toward common property. Empirical examples of these shifts are discussed. Collective governance institutions are critical to the process; in fact, changes in governance institutions can lead to property rights changes in the absence of changes in underlying economic factors. Copyright 1989 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Kyklos.

Volume (Year): 42 (1989)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 319-45
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Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:42:y:1989:i:3:p:319-45

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